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Considering the current economic reality, one must realize the dominant market position 
assumed by multinational corporations through the establishment of highly integrated 
operations between their subsidiaries. Such context is completely contrary to the one 
where separated and independent enterprises act. 
In light of a new economic and business paradigm, the arm’s length principle starts to be 
questioned as the most appropriate method to cope with transfer pricing issues and the 
negative impacts that may arise from such transactions. At the same time, other 
approaches are starting to be suggested by academics in order to combat the flaws of the 
actual system, namely a unitary regime. 
It is possible to foresee a long discussion about what is the right approach to be adopted, 
as both standards reveal strengths and weaknesses. 
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Atendendo à atual realidade económica, torna-se importante compreender a posição 
dominante que as empresas multinacionais ocupam no mercado, através da realização de 
operações altamente integradas estabelecidas entre as suas subsidiárias. Este contexto é 
completamente oposto àquele onde entidades separadas e independentes atuam. 
À luz de um novo paradigma económico e negocial, o princípio da plena concorrência 
tem começado a ser questionado enquanto método mais apropriado para lidar com 
problemas em matéria de preços de transferência e com possíveis impactos negativos que 
daí possam advir. Paralelamente, outras metodologias têm sido sugeridas de modo a 
combater as falhas do atual sistema, nomeadamente o sistema unitário. 
Tendo em conta que ambos os regimes apresentam várias vantagens e desvantagens, é 
possível prever um longo debate sobre qual será o método mais adequado a adotar. 
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“Taxes, after all, are dues that we pay for the 
privileges of membership in an organized society.” 
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If the phenomenon of economy development and globalization is from one side welcomed 
by international community, the same cannot be said regarding tax avoidance and tax 
evasion1, as two of the world’s tax most critical issues over the past few years. 
 
Multinational companies appear as the dominant actor of the current international 
business landscape, settling a strong position on a major part of global transactions. It can 
be said that the appearance of MNEs is in the genesis of transfer prices, with the 
constitution of new and different business organization models allowing for a 
geographical and economic expansion beyond the national boundaries, demonstrating the 
“octopus phenomenon” of MNEs.  The existence of complex corporate structures 
becomes a predominance, being most of the transactions performed by a highly integrated 
network of subsidiaries or branches which act under a common direction and interest2. 
 
The fact that the main goal of MNEs is profit maximization offers no resistance, but a full 
understanding of the reasons behind the multinational internal transactions might be 
revealed to be an inglorious task, as well as a “deception game” for tax administrations 
and legislators. The possibility of tax avoidance through the exploit of legal tax loopholes 
and lack of coordination amongst countries assures the unfairness of corporate profits 
taxation3, which later results in the frustration of SMEs and individual taxpayers4. 
 
The OECD seems to be aware of this problem that strikes the fiscal revenue of most States 
and jeopardizes their commitment to prosecute their public function regarding security, 
infrastructures, education and other basic collective needs. The 2015 final BEPS report, 
composed by fifteen actions can be seen as a reaction to tax avoidance, making part of 
the creation of a new international tax framework, able to implement and most of all apply 





                                                          
1 The idea of MNEs “refrain from tax avoidance practices and pay their fair share” was stated by the Dutch 
Finance Minister and European President Jeroen Dijsselbloem at an EU Finance Ministers meeting in 
Brussels, Belgium, 2016. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-taxavoidance/times-are-
changing-pay-your-taxes-euro-zone-chief-tells-corporations-idUSKCN11G0AB?il=0  
2 UN (2013), paragraph 1.1.3- refers that a significant volume of global trade these days consists of 
international transfer of goods and services, capital and intangibles within the MNE group. 
3 As pointed by EU Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen. Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-taxavoidance/times-are-changing-pay-your-taxes-euro-zone-chief-
tells-corporations-idUSKCN11G0AB  
4 The same illustrious Politic said in 2016: “What is clear is that with every new case of unfair tax practice 





1.2. Research developed: motivation and method 
 
Research Motivation 
During my master in tax law at Católica University of Porto, I had the opportunity to 
attend the course of Tax Planning, where I came across the theme of Transfer Pricing and 
their role in the present international tax stage and its inward relationship with MNEs 
economic policies. As one of the most prominent challenges of our days in a constantly 
changing environment, the fight against aggressive tax planning became global, being 
transfer pricing under the spotlight of the international community, as well as the ALP as 
the best solution to determine transfer pricing. 
Thus, my interest to understand to what extent is it possible to adopt a new international 
tax method and respective consequences of that. 
The fact that this theme is regarded as unexplored, where no profound reflection has yet 
occurred, only contributed to increase our personal motivation. 
 
Problem Overview 
Multinational enterprises are spread all around the world, establishing a considerable 
number of (internal) transactions, some commercially motivated, others purely tax 
motived. This results in a difficult, if not impossible, mission of tax authorities to know 
which profits are to be taxed, to which entity should they be allocated, which country has 
the right to tax a certain profit, etc. Innumerous questions are left hanging, resulting in an 
increase loss of tax revenue. The international standard accepted is the Arm’s Length 
Principle, as countries last hope to fight against transfer pricing, although voices started 
to argument some deficiencies of this method and pointed towards different paths. It is 
precisely this mismatch of the ALP with the modern business models designed by MNEs 
and possible alternatives, that I will describe in this thesis. 
 
Research Question 
This master thesis will be focused on the following question: 
 “Is the Arm’s Length Principle the most efficient method to determine transfer 
prices and to solve the problems related to the allocation of profits amongst different tax 




This thesis was based on an intensive research of articles and opinions from several 
prestigious authors about transfer pricing, the ALP and its alternatives. We put our best 
effort to analyze the discussed method – advantages and disadvantages -, to present other 
alternatives and expose the viability of each one of them. 
As is our intention to address the level of principles rather than the plan of 
implementation, the research was focused on foreign bibliography. 
We assume entire responsibility for any scientific mistake or grammatical error that this 






1.3.  Some definitions 
 
To have a clear and sober notion of what we pretend to analyze with this thesis, we believe 
to be essential to briefly explain some of the terms that will be used throughout the work. 
 
What is Base Erosion? 
Base erosion concerns to a tax planning strategy that exploits loopholes and mismatches 
between different tax rules, in order to make profits “disappear” for tax purposes, 
therefore decreasing the tax base of a certain entity and the amount of tax payable in a 
specific jurisdiction. 
 
What is Profit Shifting? 
As the name may suggest, profit shifting corresponds to a movement of profits from 
jurisdictions where the activities generating those profits occurred to another jurisdiction 
where those profits will be subject to no or low-tax rates5. This represents an aggressive 
tax planning strategy, often used by MNEs to avoid their fair share of domestic tax. 
 
What is Transfer Pricing? 
Transfer pricing corresponds to the price charged by one company to another company 
within the same organization for transfer or sharing goods, services or other resources 
(intra-firm transactions). We can establish a distinctive line “with a market price, which 
is the price set in the marketplace for transfers (…) between unrelated persons.”6 The 
prices here practiced are not based on the same conditions as the ones practiced between 
independent parties acting under ‘normal market forces’, the so-called “arm’s length 
prices”. 
 
What is a Related Entity? 
To determine the existence of “related entities” we must analyze the element of control. 
Usually, the different parts of the same organization are “owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the same interests.”7 The level of control present in the relationship can be 
verified by the power to establish transfer prices, different from market prices. 
“The degree of control (…) varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but generally looks for 







                                                          
5 There is also the possibility of a profit deflection from a low tax country to a high tax country, if a “(…) 
member of their affiliated group has losses in that country or if they are able to exploit some loophole (…)” 
in that high tax jurisdiction, in ARNOLD & MCINTYRE (2002), p.55. 
6 Ibid. p.55. 
7 Ibid. p.55. 




1.4.  Transfer pricing contextualization: a change in the international 
landscape 
 
Transfer pricing has become a fundamental tax issue over the last years, both for 
taxpayers and tax authorities, therefore trying to establish an economic and political path 
on this subject can be revealed as an extremely challenging task. 
 
“[I]n step with the economy globalization, worldwide intra-group trade has grown 
exponentially.”9 Considered this idea of globalization as an “ever-increasing 
transnational”10 phenomenon and the fall of boundaries to international trade, we must 
face the world as a global market featured by developments in information technology 
and communications, in which MNEs business activities and economic transactions 
assume special prominence11. Emerging from this economic context MNEs appear has an 
“an integrated hierarchical business organization [which] is superior in efficiency terms 
when compared with the interaction of independent firms in the open market”12, allowing 
them to practice an economy of scale and to set the prices internally (different from 
unrelated companies). Transactions on a multinational corporate level are highly driven 
by common interests, different in all aspects from market forces existing between 
independent entities. Facing such unequal reality, it becomes urgent to determine the 
transfer price, i.e. the right price. 
 
Transfer Pricing, as a pricing policy, is the primary method used on (and through) 
international tax law to allocate profits among different jurisdictions according to a 
“minimum tax cost” criteria; naturally, the countries’ tax base will end up being molded 
in the same way. 
 
As already referred, MNEs operate on a global scale which demands a high coordinated 
procedure. Hence, a challenge arises for them concerning the decentralization of the 
decision-making process between the entire company web, considered all the subsidiaries 
and branches with distinct locations – here, it is possible to argue the transfer pricing 
practice as a strategy to face the complexity of some decisions that may require a 
delegation of responsibilities within the corporation. 
Considered the business coordination element, transfer pricing can also be deployed for 
tax purposes13, as an aggressive tax planning tool. Profits are, therefore, shift to lower tax 
jurisdictions with the objective of decrease the MNE overall tax burden and avoid heavier 
tax liabilities that in normal conditions the corporation would be subject to. 
At this point, we are dealing with a harmful tax planning mechanism, that compromises 
the wealth of states national tax system, preventing them from receiving their “fair 
                                                          
9 OECD (2015a), p.27. 
10 RECTENWALD (2012), p.428. 
11 “(…) over 60% of world trade takes place within MNEs and so potentially gives rise to transfer pricing 
issues.” in NEIGHBOUR & OWENS (2002), p.952. 
12 SCHÖN (2011), p.5. 




share”14 of corporate tax revenue. Such tax motivated transactions often suffer an 
adjustment15, granting a (closer) correct allocation of taxable profits. 
 
Against this background, corporate taxation has become a major concern for tax 
authorities all over the world16, not just for OECD countries but also for emerging 
economies such as BRICS due to the MNEs international widespread settled net – 
although their operations are internationally dispersed, they are centrally coordinated. The 
importance of transfer pricing for tax and economic purposes is undoubtedly viewed by 
countries as common ground. 
 
The discipline of transfer pricing has its foundations on two major principles: under a 
“separate entity approach” each company integrated in a TNC will be taxed and have its 
profits computed as if it operates individually, based on separate accounting17; in 
accordance with the ALP, prices charged between related companies must correspond to 
the prices that would have been practice amongst unrelated entities. Weighting this 
principle relation, RECTENWALD points that “[d]epending upon arms-length transfer 
pricing adjustments is a dysfunctional solution to a problem that is needlessly perpetuated 
by the insistence on separate entity treatment and the significance of transfer prices.”18 
 
Bearing in mind that most of cross-border transactions are conducted by MNEs, it is 
relevant to mention that the various purposes for companies to start using transfer pricing 
is “to help identify which parts of the enterprise are not performing well, to escape double 
taxation when repatriating profits and ultimately to reduce tax.”19 
 
As aforementioned, it offers no resistance that the members of the same corporate group 
often manipulate the prices charged within the group to achieve an expected cost 
minimization, albeit, “[t]he mere fact that a transaction may not be found between 
independent parties does not of itself mean that it is not arm’s length.”20 There are reasons 
to believe that economic and market alliances aiming convergent goals are frequently 






                                                          
14 ASAKAWA, p.7. 
15 OECD (2015a), p.27. 
16 KOFLER (2013), p.650. 
17 “(…) the OECD member countries have decided, on balance, to adopt the “functionally separate entity” 
approach as the “authorised OECD approach (…)”; “(…) the authorised OECD approach is that the profits 
to be attributed to a PE are the profits that the PE would have earned at arm’s length if it were a legally 
distinct and separate enterprise performing the same or similar functions under the same or similar 
conditions (…) in OECD (2006), p.12. 
18 RECTENWALD (2012), p.441-442. 
19 HASKIC (2009), p.2. 




1.5.  BEPS and the OECD role: general ideas 
 
At the Los Cabos meeting, on June 2012, the G2021 22 Leaders reiterated “[their] 
commitment to strengthen transparency and comprehensive exchange of information”, 
just as “the need to prevent base erosion and profit shifting”, and stated that they would 
“follow with attention the ongoing work of the OECD in this area.”23 
 
Discussion around base erosion and profit shifting has reached the level of political 
priority of OECD24 25 and non-OECD countries’ agenda. A tangible proof of this is the 
(lengthy) Report released by the OECD on Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
published on February 2013, - stating the countries’ concern regarding the serious risk to 
tax revenues and tax fairness26 resultant from MNE aggressive tax planning - and the 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting27, published on July 2013.  
 
There is a need to recognize that beyond the current problem of tax compliance, and the 
obvious massive loss of tax revenue, base erosion and profit shifting also stand a major 
threat to tax sovereignty and to “the trust in the integrity of tax systems of all countries”, 
producing “a negative impact on investment, services and competition, and thus on 
growth and employment globally.”28 
 
The Report confirms the difficulty “to reach solid conclusions about how much BEPS 
actually occurs”, mentioning, however, “the circumstantial evidence that BEPS behaviors 
                                                          
21 The G20 policy is based on three main purposes: “policy coordination between its members in order to 
achieve global economic stability, sustainable growth; promoting financial regulations that reduce risks and 
prevent future financial crises; modernizing international financial architecture”. Available at: 
http://en.g20russia.ru/docs/about/about_G20.html   
22 The G20 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, the European Union, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
23 G20 Leaders Declaration at Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012, para.48, Available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.pdf  
Special note for the G8 Leaders Communiqué at the 2013 Lough Erne, stating that “On tax avoidance, we 
support the OECD’s work to tackle base erosion and profit shifting.” p.1, Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207771/Lough_Erne_2013
_G8_Leaders_Communique.pdf  
24 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has the goal to promote “policies that 
will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world”. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/about/  
25 The current members of the OECD are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
26 ERNST & YOUNG (2013). Available at: http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--
oecd-releases-report-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting  
27 The G20 Finance Ministers expressed, at the 2013 meeting in Moscow, that they “fully endorse the 
ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan submitted at the request of the G-20 by the OECD aimed at 
addressing base erosion and profit shifting.”, p.5. 
Available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013_Final_Communique_FM_July_ENG.pdf  
28 Declaration on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting at the Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, 




are widespread.”29 The secrecy around transfer pricing and the lack of transparency to the 
public on media tax cases, such as Google, Amazon or Starbucks, is regarded as a most 
undesirable practice. 
 
Although some may argue that the OECD Report did not have the impact that was 
expected, or that it did not offer effective solutions, its prominent role must be noted. 
Being the initial response to the G20 mandate, the Report operates a comprehensive 
analysis of the structural causes and consequences of base erosion and profit shifting, and 
refuses any sort of unilateral action as a solution for the problem. Against this 
background, it proposes that “[a] holistic and comprehensive approach is necessary to 
address the issue.”30 This integrated approach31 was, therefore, endeavored with the 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting32. 
 
With regard to the matter of transfer pricing, upon which this thesis is based, the Action 
Plan dedicates four actions of a total of fifteen contemplated actions: 
 
- Action 8: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: 
Intangibles 
- Action 9: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: 
Risks and capital 
- Action 10: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value 
creation: Other high-risk transactions 
- Action 13: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation 
 
It should be furthermore noted the existence of a Report33, which “contains revised 
guidance [that] responds to these issues and ensures that transfer pricing rules secure [tax 
fair] outcomes (…)”34. In addition of being a direction line, providing a helpful supporting 
instrument, it also “represents an agreement of the countries participating in the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Project.”35 
 
Taking a closer look at the chronological element, it is possible to observe that the Action 
Plan procedure was conducted in just two years – which is applaudable. This only reveals 
the urgency of such diploma, either for political, business or social reasons. 
As a project of global dimensions, BEPS presents itself as the result of “all G20 and 
OECD countries [working] on an equal footing [and] developing countries [that] were 
engaged extensively from the outset, via a number of different consultation 
                                                          
29 OECD (2013a), p.15. 
30 “No More Shifty Business”, available at:  
https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/OECD_Beps_130327_No_more_shifty_business.pdf, p.2. 
31 Pascal Saint-Amans, Director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, reaffirms the very 
importance of a global coordinated action by mention that the work on BEPS “(…) could not be done by 
OECD countries alone if it was going to work.”, in SAINT-AMANS (2014), p.68-69. 
32  Enforces “fundamental changes (…) designed to prevent and counter base erosion and profit shifting”, 
in OECD (2013b), p.13. 
33 To better explain and implement the 15 Actions, 13 Reports were published. 
34 OECD (2015a), p.28. 




mechanisms.”36 In fact, this can be considered the BEPS first great accomplishment: “For 
the first time all OECD and G20 countries have worked together on an equal footing to 
design common responses to international tax challenges [with an] unprecedented 
participation by developing countries in the development of commonly-agreed 
international tax standards”37, which among other aspects, highlights a strong political 
will. 
 
The work developed by OECD and G20 in the BEPS program demonstrates a high-level 
of commitment towards solutions of a group of identified widespread problems. 
This, naturally, creates great expectations amongst the governments involved that BEPS 
is able to have a profound impact on company’s corporate structure and their abusive 
practices38 39. 
 
Under the international community watchful eye, BEPS takes on an additional political 
importance. The OECD countries have maintained a dominant position over the 
international tax arena for more than 50 years, and even though the supporting role of the 
G20, the BEPS project bears the OECD “stamp”. Thus, this project may create some 
political pressure at the shoulders of the international organization, due to an almost 
imperative need to reach a “successful outcome (…) so that they can keep control over 
international tax policy”40. 
In the worst-case scenario, i.e. failure of the project, the leadership of OECD over 









                                                          
36 OECD (2015b), p.4. 
37 OECD (2015c), p.5. 
38 “The interim report shows that the OECD and the G20 member states have achieved a lot of progress in 
the Base Erosion & Profit Shifting project (…) [fighting] against international tax avoidance.”, published 
by the Government of the Netherlands.  
Available at: https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2014/09/19/the-netherlands-welcomes-progress-in-
the-fight-against-international-tax-avoidance  
39 “With 100 countries and jurisdictions [working together] to tackle base erosion and profit shifting, strong 
progress in addressing this global problem is underway.”, in OECD (2017), p.31. 





Chapter II – The Arm´s Length Principle 
 
2.1.    Background 
 
Historically, the ALP has a long and interesting tradition that can be traced back to the 
beginning of the 20th century.  
 
The League of Nations assembled, in 1928, a Fiscal Committee that entrusted with the 
development of principles for the allocation of tax jurisdiction. The task was executed by 
Mitchell B. Carroll, whom investigated three methodologies for the problem of business 
income allocation: the separate accounting method; empirical methods (later referred by 
Carroll as the fallback measure for separate accounting); and formulary apportionment41. 
The result was a draft made by the Committee in 1933 (which was followed by the 1935 
draft), where it is possible to see the reference “dealing at arm’s length”42 as a promotion 
of the arm’s length method over other methods. 
 
During World War I, the need for transfer pricing legislations became a prominent 
necessity in countries such as U.S. and U.K. in order to prevent the shifting of profits in 
a time where taxes assumed a critical political importance.43 
In 1935, the ALP was first implemented in U.S. tax regulations, stating that “[t]he 
standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's 
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.”44 The function undertook by the article was 
the reallocation of income and deductions amongst controlled taxpayers in respect to 
intra-group transactions established between them. 
By the time, the concern was to empower fiscal authorities to assure that income was 
taxed where it belongs, therefore standing against profit shifting strategies perpetrated 
through suspicious related transactions. 
 
The consciousness over the importance of tax revenue to the performance of government 
obligations was already a reality45. Thus, we believe it is righteous to say that the moral 
tax compass was born around this time with a demonstration of deep concern regarding 
the preservation of corporate tax base against evasive tax planning practices. 
 
In 1963, the ALP was adopted in art.9º of the OECD MTC, and later in 1980 the UN 
followed the same path – as it is possible to see in art.9º of UN MDTC between Developed 
and Developing Countries. 
 
                                                          
41 MARKHAM (2005), p.15. 
42 League of Nations (1935), art.3º. 
43 Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (2010), p.5. 
44 Art. 45-1/b) “Determination of the taxable net income of a controlled taxpayer”, of Regulations 86 related 
to the Income Tax under the Revenue Act of 1934, U.S. Treasury Department. Available at: 
http://constitution.org/tax/us-ic/regs/Regs_86_for_1934_act.pdf  
45 “A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the necessity of maintaining a suitable business 
environment. (…) New business creates new tasks, entails further public expense [and therefore] (…) taxes 




The feature that better suits ALP is clearly its global application, “as it forms the basis of 
an extensive network of bilateral income tax treaties between OECD member countries 
and between OECD member countries and non-OECD economies”46 and it is present in 
most of country’s domestic tax legislation. 
 
 
2.2.    OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines: special note 
 
An increase of MNEs and the frequency of related transactions since 1960’s exposed 
the need for further guidance on transfer pricing, leading to a reaction by OECD that 
considered the real necessity to develop practical guidance for its members’ tax 
authorities. 
 
To a large extent, the 1968 U.S. rules on controlled transactions had a considerable 
influence in the discussions and development of the OECD Guidelines47. 
 
The OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, in particular Working Party No.6, produced 
in 1979 the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, which was not meant to create an extensive set of regulation, “but 
rather to set out the problems and the considerations to be taken into account and to 
describe which methods and practices were acceptable from a tax point of view in 
determining transfer prices.”48. 
 
The OECD Guidelines are continuously reviewed and updated in order to deal and cope 
with the massive changes and challenges posed by technological developments and an 
overwhelming globalized economy. 
In 1995, the Guidelines were updated to deal with the mentioned challenges and also to 
“bridge the differences which have arisen between the United States and other OECD 
countries”49; in 2010, another update was made to the Guidelines to consider the 
revision of the guidance on comparability and profit methods (chapter I-III of the 
Guidelines) and on business restructurings (chapter IX of the Guidelines). 
 
As mentioned by WITTENDORFF, the OECD Guidelines have the aim to “create a 
uniform international legal approach to the application of the arm’s length principle”50 
and, therefore, narrow the differences between different tax systems. 
 
Despite the objectives undertaken by the OECD Guidelines, such implementation poses 
great difficulties due to the existent gap between developed and developing countries, 
that only appears to be increasing. 
 
 
                                                          
46 RUITER (2012), p.1. 
47 WITTENDORFF (2010), p.14-15. 
48 Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Tenth meeting (2001), p.7. 
49 Ibid., p.19. 




2.3.    A first incursion 
 
“Dealing at arm’s length” means that transactions established between related parties are 
to be considered as if the parties involved were independent, dealing under identical 
conditions and economic circumstances. This principle intends to assure an equal ground 
of treatment amongst TNCs (operating internally) and separate business entities 
(operating independently)51, neutralizing the effects that may arise from such difference 
and, thus, ensuring that this does not result in position distortions created by undue tax 
advantages for MNEs52. 
 
We can, therefore, determine that the philosophy behind the ALP is “that each affiliated 
company within the group transacts with other members of the group in the same way 
that it would transact if the members were unrelated”53 and thereby at market prices. 
The ALP global acceptance, along with its recommendation and adoption54 by OECD as 
the international transfer pricing standard, arises in response to this need of determine the 
right “market price” for intra-group transactions. However, such accurately determination 
may reveal genuine difficulties for tax authorities, as OECD seems to be aware.55 
 
Being the uncontrolled transactions subject to the forces of a full competitive market and 
its strengths (setting the bar of what will be considered “arm’s length”), one can obtain a 
“benchmark against which the controlled transactions can be evaluated.”56 Therefore, a 
transfer pricing review is made based on a comparability analysis that has its fundament 
both on art.9º of the OECD MTC57 58 and art.9º of the UN MDTC – the same method is 
also present in art.7º of the OECD MTC, as it is embedded in several treaties and 
countries’ national legislations (although it does not mean that it is explained the same 
way in each country). 
 
The principle, as established in art.9º/1 of the OECD MTC, determines that: “Where (…) 
conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or 
financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one 
of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” 
                                                          
51 The same idea is provided in PICCIOTTO (2012), p.3. 
52 SCHOUERI (2015), p.695. 
53 AVI-YONAH (2009), p.3. 
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OECD (2010a), para. 1.14-1.15. 
55 “Tax administrations should not automatically assume that associated enterprises have sought to 
manipulate their profits.”, in OECD (2010b), p.4. 
56 NEIGHBOUR & OWENS (2002), p.952. 
57 Setting “(…) forth the requirement for a comparison between conditions made or imposed between 
associated enterprises and those that would be made between independent enterprises.”, in RUSSO & 
BOYKIN (2008), p.1. 




Objectives such as fair allocation of the tax base in each jurisdiction and the avoidance of 
double taxation, demonstrate why this principle is embodied in a considerable number of 
legal documents and treaties59. 
 
The establishment of “an appropriate adjustment” in paragraph 2 of the same article 
materializes the aforementioned principle, while assures a minimization or elimination of 
economic double-taxation60. 
In this regard, transfer pricing adjustment is defined as a pure correction mechanism 
which recognizes for tax purposes the real transaction and assures a proper allocation of 
taxable profits amongst the related parties – an increase in the profits of one company 
will dictate a corresponding decrease in the profits of the affiliated member. 
It is also important to note that the possibility of tax administrations to make adjustments 
based on tax treaties will always be limited by domestic tax law, i.e. the taxing rights of 
each country cannot be broadened by a tax treaty, “in accordance with the so-called 
golden rule of tax treaty law.”61 
 
Despite the (well-known) fact that transfer pricing practices are used for tax purposes, the 
concept of transfer pricing “(…) should not be [legally or economically] confused with 
the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance (…)”62. Furthermore, and 
considered the existent corporate economic dynamic, it becomes fundamental to 
distinguish between tax motivated and business motivated transactions, as internal cross-
border activity may be established without the purpose of profit manipulation, but instead 
due to valid economic reasons; based on this premise tax authorities should consider the 
existence of other purposes than tax avoidance63 64. 
The possibility of a different solution in this matter would only lead to two undesirable 
outcomes: first, the disregard of commercial motivated decisions by fiscal authorities 
would eventually lead to a global decline of the business flow; second, if tax motivated 
transactions were recognized MNEs would be completely free to choose the jurisdiction 
where they would want their profits to be taxed65. 
 
The international siege appears to be closing on the ALP and it is precisely its core that 
is currently under strong attack by academics, stating SCHÖN that this standard “cannot be 
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defended as a business concept as it generically misses the efficiency requirements within 
the firm”66, assuming, instead, the role of a legal concept. 
This issue, among others, will be discussed throughout this thesis, as the ALP seems to 
fail the business purpose of MNEs, demonstrating some limitations regarding the wide 
economic global scenario where these companies currently transact. 
 
 
2.4.    Transfer pricing methods 
 
To determine if a certain price is in accordance with the ALP a comparability analysis 
must be made based on the five methods recommend by the OECD TPG, which will 
verify whether the conditions settled by the related parties are in line with the principle: 
the traditional transactional methods67 (comparable uncontrolled price method; resale 
price method; cost-plus method) and the transactional profit methods68 (transactional net 
margin method and the profit split method)69. Between the methods provided by the 
Guidelines, the OECD seems to show a preference for the application of traditional 
methods over the profit methods70. 
 
On the one hand, the OECD TPG establish a “freedom of choice” for the taxpayer to 
choose the specific method to be applied71; however, considered the circumstances, some 
methods may provide more accurate results than others and therefore the taxpayer’s 
choice must be consistent, i.e. plausible. 
 
A comparability analysis is required to take place, at first, as an essential feature for a 
proper application of the ALP before the choose of a certain method – entails the 
identification of an uncontrolled transaction that is comparable to the transaction under 
evaluation. 
When determining the comparability, it is important to consider the existence of five 
distinct factors72: 
 
- Characteristics of the property or services transferred 
Characteristics such as physical features, quality, intangible property involved and others, 
may be useful for comparison; 
 
- Functions performed by the parties  
Several factors, such as functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, can have a 
direct influence over the price of the transaction; 
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67 These methods focus the analysis on the transactions and the prices charged.  
68 The analysis made by these methods is based on the transaction, taking into account the element of profits. 
69 OECD (2010a), para.2.1. 
70 Ibid. para.2.3. 
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- contractual terms 
Usually determine how the responsibilities, risks and benefits are to be divided between 
the parties; 
 
- economic circumstances of the parties 
The economic circumstances that can be determinant for the comparability procedure 
may diverge from one market to the other; 
 
- business strategies pursued by the parties 
To analyze the business strategy of a specific company several factors need to be 
considered, such as innovation, product development, diversification, and many others. 
Even two distinct companies that produce the exact same good or service can follow 
different business strategies, that for instance can include market penetration or market 
expansion. Naturally, this may lead to extremely difficult assessment problems. 
 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method 
The CUP method compares the price of a transaction between related entities in a 
controlled business environment with the market price, by reference to a similar 
transaction established between unrelated entities in similar circumstances. 
If a comparable situation exists this is the preferred method, since is the most direct and 
reliable method, especially for manufactured goods or other products sold on public 
commodity markets73. Although, this method is not appropriate to set the price for 
intermediate assets, as to goods that are intimately dependent of intangible property. 
Is important to note that adjustments are possible to made in two cases, if the conditions 
between the parties are not identical: the differences do not materially affect the arm’s 
length price; or reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material 
effects of such differences. 
 
Resale Price Method 
This method defines as its starting point the market price at which products are sold to 
unrelated parties. A suitable markup – containing the value of sales, other costs from 
activities performed, and a reasonable margin – is then decreased from the market price, 
setting the arm’s length price for related transactions. 
 
Cost-Plus Method 
The method starts by distinguish the direct and indirect costs that can be attributable to 
the related seller, and other costs that cannot be assign to the related transaction. With 
reference to a gross profit margin earned by suppliers in a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction, an appropriate amount of profit is added to these costs, which reflects the 
activities performed and overhead costs. 
The determination of transfer price according to this method is based on the total costs 
incurred by the related producer. 
 
                                                          




Transactional Net Margin Method 
The TNMM uses an operational net margin that is applied over a certain economic 
indicator, for example costs, sales or assets. The result provides an arm’s length ratio of 
profits that is compared to an independent transaction, operated under similar 
circumstances – the transfer price is then accepted by tax administration if it falls within 
the arm’s length range of the comparable transaction.  
It may be helpful for the determination of transfer prices related to tangible and intangible 
property. 
 
Profit Split Method 
This method is traditionally applied when the traditional methods are not suitable. 
For situations where intra-group transactions reveal a high level of integration, making it 
extremely difficult, or even impossible, to apply a separate approach for each related 
member. 
The PSM computes the worldwide taxable income of the related companies, which is then 
proportionally distributed amongst the related affiliates according to the participation that 
each member had to attain that profit – seek to obtain the result that better reflects the 
ALP. 
Regard intangible property, the use of profit split method may provide a solution built on 
the parties’ relative contributions to the development of the intangible. 
 
The fact that the OECD TPG refer a “most appropriate method” approach “does not imply 
that all methods will have to be tested.”74 Indeed, the preference of Working Party Nº6 
for traditional methods is of practical nature: the combination of an internal comparable 
with traditional methods is a “low-hanging fruit”, both for taxpayers and tax 
administrations. 
 
Despite the preference shown by OECD, caution should be advised considering the lack 
of information needed to execute a proper comparability analysis. 
Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of each method and the known factual 
data (for example the product, conditions, risks, activities performed, costs, contractual 
terms, intangible property, geographical location, even the market and its behavior)75, the 
chosen method must be the one who demonstrates more appropriateness to the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
 
2.5.    Arm’s Length: merits and pitfalls 
 
The OECD has always expressed a firm “stay-the-course attitude”76 towards the ALP as 
can be observed in the OECD TPG, where several advantages from its application are 
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pointed77 - the statement of grounds present in the Guidelines can be seen as the generally 
agreed-upon justification of the ALP to govern transfer prices issues. 
 
As the method recommended by the OECD, the ALP expresses the international 
consensus78 for the most effective way to counter transfer pricing schemes, assuming 
therefore a positive contribution to reach a level of certainty and predictability in an 
international business and taxation environment. The broad acceptance – wide and 
uniform implementation – reveals to be one of the strongest points of the principle.  
Against this background, moving away from it would not just threaten the common 
ground that has been created, but would also increase “the chances of conflicting 
allocations that lead to double taxation”79. 
 
Secondly, from the perspective of taxation policy the arm’s length standard contributes 
to tax equality and neutrality – two core principles in tax law –, and with this assures an 
equal tax treatment between associated corporations and independent enterprises80. 
Thus, it prevents the distortion of competitive positions by avoiding tax advantages or 
disadvantages, which is mandatory to guarantee the market equilibrium. Ultimately, the 
ALP is able to stimulate the growth of international trade and investment by eliminate 
any tax motivations from economic decisions81. 
 
Regardless the “significant cases in which the arm’s length principle is difficult and 
complicated to apply” – namely, integrated production of goods and intangibles –, the 
principle is regarded to work in an effective way for the “vast majority of cases”82. 
 
The element of comparability analyses, at the core of ALP, is also capable of provide the 
closest approximation between two different economic realities, since it attends to the 
specific facts and circumstances of the intra-firm transaction and uses the normal market 
activity as a benchmark. In this respect, the standard is used to determine the true and 
actual prices of related transfers83. 
 
Finally, the inherent flexibility to adjust to new challenges and business realities, such as 
global trading, intangibles or information developments, is also another valuable feature 
mentioned by advocates of this principle84. 
 
As previously mentioned, the ALP is under heavy criticism by the international 
community, passing through a critical breaking point as the globally accepted and applied 
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standard. Despite the known merits, several authors have contested the viability of the 
principle by exposing its weaknesses and shortcomings85. 
 
One of the main pointed critics lays on the foundations of the arm’s length principle, since 
a separate entity approach fails to reflect the economic reality of MNEs, as integrated 
enterprises arise to achieve an international dimension and relatedness (synergies) that 
enables to decrease inefficiencies and to take advantage of economies of scope and 
scale86. The treatment of such relatedness “as incidental to intra-firm transactions is the 
economic fallacy at the heart”87 of the arm’s length principle. 
 
Another argument that is constantly referred concerns the lack of comparables. If one 
remembers the background of ALP, developed in a low tech, bricks-and-mortar economy, 
a profound contrast is possible to establish against a current high-developed tech and 
economic scenario, where intangible property and new forms of communication prevail. 
The “belief” that comparable transactions can be found amongst unrelated enterprises and 
that they can provide a suitable benchmark to determine the arm’s length price for 
controlled transactions is declared to be another “fallacy that lies at the system’s central 
core”88 89. 
Indeed, there are specific markets where the creation of MNEs and the existence of 
enterprises acting under common control poses advantages, therefore being “unlikely that 
reasonably close uncontrolled comparables can be found”90. 
Considering this argument, the reconstruction of an arm’s length reality with reference to 
what independent and unrelated parties would have done under similar circumstances, 
assumes the form of a Sisyphean task, since the “existence of comparables is based on an 
illusion about the open market.”91. 
Consequently, the prices evaluation, adjustments, and ultimately the ALP are based on 
pure estimates instead of solid information and accurate elements, that lead to uncertainty 
and systematic impreciseness92. 
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The creation of an incentive to decrease the amount of payable tax by artificially allocate 
the profits in low-tax countries – whether through relocation of real economic activities, 
or through profit-shifting – is also regarded as a drawback of ALP93. 
 
The arm’s length approach is extremely complex, which further results in large amounts 
of resources spent either by taxpayers and tax administrations. The documentation 
requirements94 dictate a high-level of compliance costs and administrative burden for 
MNEs, due, in part, to “the highly subjective nature” and “vagueness” of this principle95. 
For tax authorities, on the other hand, this conducts to substantial enforcement costs, since 
effective tax assessment can prove to be time-consuming and require specific skills96. 
It is certain that the actual burdensome and transfer pricing rules represent an obstacle to 
MNEs profit shifting, through the referred degree of documentation these enterprises are 
required to reveal, but it “[comes] at the tremendous costs associated with compliance, 
administration and litigation.”97. 
 
Although the ALP is stated and enforced as the regulatory standard for income allocation 
in international and national law, one must recognize that fiscal problems arising from 
profit allocation amongst related parties is a problem that remains to be resolved. 
Neither side is pleased with the current tax system: fiscal authorities continue to report 
the employment of transfer pricing strategies by large corporations as a means for tax 
avoidance; whilst, MNEs have to deal with heavy compliance requirements (and 
respective costs), dealing at the same time with the risk of double taxation. 
 
Thus, as a norm of international dimensions in tax matters, the arm’s length principle is 
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[therefore] provide for the smooth functioning of the Internal Market.”, in Commission of the European 
Communities (2001), p.346-347. 
95 Rectenwald goes even further by stating that the arm’s length principle “is a failure because it is based 
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Chapter III – Is there an alternative to the Arm’s Length Principle? 
 
3.1.    Unitary Taxation – A paradigm shift 
 
Since 1930’s, when the “separate entity approach” was first internationally agreed to cope 
with transfer pricing, it was already, at the time, discussed that in practice tax 
administrations should have a holistic view at company’s overall accounts so that a fair 
split of the total profits amongst the affiliates could be obtained98. 
 
An increased use of “transactional profit methods” over the last years, indicates a slight 
change towards unitary taxation. Indeed, the European Commission proposal for a unitary 
system (CCCTB), confirms this idea as the “first formal international proposal for a 
unitary approach”99.  
 
In the past, fiscal authorities “(…) did not have the right to demand information about 
enterprise’s business establishments in other states, [since it] could contribute to 
animosity, (…) differences in accounting principles, languages, currencies, etc. would 
create problems”100 and difficulty to agree on “(…) general global principles [to solve] 
the issues of international allocation of the tax base of international business”101 was a 
clear gap. However, the phenomenon of globalization alerted the countries to the major 
difficulty to tax MNEs on their overseas profits, and so focus was given to a more 
territorial basis. 
 
Under unitary taxation, multinational corporations would be treated as a “single unit, 
disregarding the formal distinctions among its constituent corporations”102, and, 
therefore, would be taxed according to their genuine economic presence in the countries 
where they (truly) operate, through a predetermined income allocation formula – as 
corporate citizens this would also assure a fair contribution towards the expenses of public 
resources in states where companies perform their business activities.  
 
Against this background, a unitary approach would bridge the widening gap between 
international tax system and economic reality, by assuming the undeniable fact that 
MNEs are created to enhance economic activities on a large scale and to optimize 
synergetic effects. On the contrary, the treatment of each affiliated member as a separate 
entity cannot reflect such business reality. 
 
In the words of PICCIOTTO, such solution would be “far more legitimate, [efficient] and 
simpler to implement than the current system”, as the Author refers that the current 
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99 PICCIOTTO (2012), p.4. 
100 WITTENDORFF (2010), p.91. 
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international tax system, under a “separate entity approach”, provides corporations with 
a vast range of possibilities to shift profits around the globe in a way that best suits their 
tax interests. 
 
The consideration of each multinational company as a single entity, would have its basis 
on the submission of a “single set of worldwide consolidated accounts in each country 
where it has a business presence”103. 
 
In our opinion, considering the features of the present economic market dynamic, a 
unitary approach would represent an interesting step towards a more coordinated and 
consistent international tax system. 
 
For a better understanding of the unitary system, it is crucial to undertake a brief analysis 
of the elements that form its central core, namely the combined report, the definition of 
unitary business and the allocation formula. 
 
- Combined Report: 
Under combined reporting, associated enterprises that are part of a unitary group are 
treated as one single entity – whole concept of the firm. Therefore, a combined report 
regarding the whole of the multinational group involved in the unitary business is required 
by each tax authority. 
Once we are dealing with consolidated accounts it is sustained that eliminates distortions 
and tax planning opportunities by disregarding all internal transfers. 
This is perceived as a key element, capable of level the playing field against the use of 
tax havens and secrecy. 
 
- Unitary Business: 
The adoption of a unitary business concept, within the framework of unitary taxation, can 
be reasonably straightforward if one is dealing with related parties whose business is 
vertically integrated. 
Against this background, it should be applied to all the separate parts of a corporation that 
are “under common control or direction”104 and “engaged in the same or related business 
activities”105. 
Thus, unitary business is traditionally regarded as a group of distinct members of a single 
entity or as a group under common control, that is organized to “(…) provide synergy and 
mutual benefit through functional integration, centralization of management, and 
economies of scale.”106 
 
- Allocation Formula: 
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A unitary approach assumes that the company’s worldwide profits result from the 
combined activities and involvement established within the group. 
Indeed, the application of a formula that uses specific factors, such as sales, assets and 
labour, would reflect this relationship of the individual group members activities 
relatively to the group’s total income, as it would “provide a measure of the extent of the 
activities of the TNC in each country where it does business (…)”107. 
Therefore, income will be computed and apportioned with reference to factors that are 
able to quantify the firm’s activities truly performed in each jurisdiction. 
 
 
3.2.    Formulary Apportionment: the concept 
 
Global jurisdiction to tax is currently divided by a maze of international tax rules. To 
overcome the present tax problems, academic literature and tax experts refer the FA as 
the most valid alternative to ALP. Although, as MORSE questions: “Would formulary 
apportionment [economically and politically] fix it?”108 
 
Formulary apportionment can be defined, in the words of the European Commission, as 
the method by which “(…) a company distributes, or apportions, its total income across 
the locations where it does business using a formula based on the share of activity it 
conducts in that location. By using a formula to distribute total profits across locations, 
the company does not need to calculate the profits earned by each member of the group 
in each location.”109 At the formula, a “weighted average of geographically specific 
apportionment factors, such as payroll, assets and sales” 110 will be considered – as 
traditionally used in several U.S. States with the so-called “Massachusetts Formula”111. 
 
An approach under this method requires a “three step system”112: determination of the 
MNE boundaries, for tax purposes; accurate determination of the global profits; and 
establishment of the formula for allocating the global profits amongst the involved tax 
jurisdictions. 
 
At this point, one can identify the structural difference between the two standards. A 
separate entity approach is based on an individual consideration and taxation of the 
group’s associated enterprises, as if they operate independently and under the conditions 
of an atomistic market; whilst, under a unitary entity approach, affiliated entities engaged 
in a common enterprise are to be considered and taxed as if they were a single corporation. 
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A reflection about what is the best (or at least suitable) method to determine the correct 
transfer price takes on greater importance if we bear in mind the imperfections113 of the 
current legal tax regime, especially regarding intangibles, highly-integrated corporate 
frameworks and lack of unrelated comparables. 
 
From the OECD perspective, the use of FA is “actively discouraged (…) on the grounds 
that [it is] arbitrary and does not satisfy the norm of arm’s length standard.”114 Indeed, a 
“[g]lobal formulary apportionment, sometimes mentioned as a possible alternative, would 
not be accepted in the theory, implementation, or practice.”115 
 
 
3.3.    The pros and cons of Formulary Apportionment 
 
For years the possibility of adopting FA as an alternative to ALP has been considered by 
several policymakers and commentators. Although the potential of FA, one must 
remember that “not all that glitters is gold”, and so, also this method exhibits drawbacks. 
 
Regardless the strong critics posed by the OECD to FA, the awareness of this 
Organization towards its claimed benefits, as stated by the Guidelines, is by itself 
remarkable116. The OECD refers that this method has been advocated on several 
fundaments: the “administrative convenience” it should provide; the better alignment 
“with economic reality”, but also with “the business realities of the relationships among 
associated enterprises”; the inappropriateness of ALP to deal with “highly integrated 
groups”; and a decrease in “compliance costs for taxpayers”. 
 
However, these arguments do not convince OECD, once it continues to not consider 
formulary apportionment as “a realistic alternative to the arm’s length principle”117. 
The OECD reasoning in this matter mainly involves applicability issues, by expressing a 
“most significant concern (…) [related to] the difficulty of implementing the system in a 
manner that both protects against double taxation and ensures single taxation.” 
Second, OECD addresses the extreme difficult challenge of reaching common ground 
amongst all countries on an international predetermined formula. Needless to say, it raises 
a concern around the political and administrative complexity that such coordinated action 
would demand. 
Third, it mentions the arbitrariness that a predetermined formula would entail, causing 
the disregard of specific facts and circumstances, such as market conditions or 
geographical disparities. 
Under the eye of OECD, exchange rates may also be an obstacle for the implementation 
of FA. 
                                                          
113 We do not go as far as Rectenwald, by classifying the arm’s length principle as a “failure”, in supra note 
94. 
114 EDEN (2009), p.612 and OECD (2010a), para.1.25. 
115 OECD (2010a), para.1.15. 
116 OECD (2010a), para.1.19 et seq. 





Moreover, and against the doctrinal understanding, the OECD argues that FA would 
“present intolerable compliance costs and data requirements because information would 
have to be gathered about the entire MNE group and presented in each jurisdiction (…)”. 
In our opinion, this argument is worthy of closer attention, since the BEPS Action Plan, 
namely Action 13118, along with the implementation of the country-by-country reporting, 
(already) leads to a significant increase in the compliance obligations of MNE groups. 
Therefore, we believe that the documentation requirements enforced under a FA context, 
are already available (at least the bases) under the current international tax regime. 
 
Finally, the OECD contra arguments that FA would be unsuitable for cases of intangible 
property valuation. Despite the undeniable difficulty to achieve accurate results in the 
field of intangibles, we have the opinion that such determination could be done in 
accordance with the criteria of where R&D activities takes place119. 
 
At this point, one should recognize the greater effort of the OECD to present a more 
detailed list of obstacles to FA than a list of its merits.  
 
Distortions may also arise under FA, as examined by WEINER, that alerts to the innermost 
relation between the factors and the firm’s decisions, in a context where profit allocation 
is made in accordance with firm-specific factors, and therefore, being able to distort the 
corporate business decisions120. 
 
The Author also observes another negative key point, which is the possibility of adoption 
of two distinct approaches (ALP and FA) by two different countries. This would result 
on the lack of common ground to establish necessary adjustments. Additionally, there 
would be a need either by taxpayers and tax administrations to maintain experts in ALP, 
with all the costs and issues that such structure would entail121. 
 
Tax planning happens today on a regular basis, almost as a firm’s ancillary activity. It 
would therefore be deceitful to believe that such phenomenon would only happen within 
an ALP system. If under a separate entity approach, tax planning assumes the form of an 
artificial profit shift through internal price manipulation, under formulary apportionment 
it would likely be undertake through a manipulation of the factors’ location, such as 
payroll or assets122. 
 
                                                          
118 Reveals the OECD intention to “develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation (…) [that] will 
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Despite the flaws that FA may prove to have, its merits are normally analyzed by contrast 
to ALP. 
Advocates of this standard sustain that a shift of paradigm would be justified on several 
grounds123. The most important argument is considered to be the correction of the 
structural flaw of ALP, by treating MNEs as a single unity and that way reflecting the 
synergetic advantages of a modern integrated globalized reality. However, if we bear in 
mind the teachings of WEINER, we have serious doubts regarding the allegations that FA 
would prevent tax planning from being facilitated124 through a contractual allocation of 
functions, risks and intangibles, and further, that it would reduce administrative burdens.  
 
Differently from a separate approach, FA does not rely on “economic studies that try to 
"estimate" arm's length prices in the absence of meaningful benchmarks”, i.e., due to tax 
liabilities based on the multinational group's global income, there is no need to find 
comparable transactions that took place amongst independent parties125, nor to consider 
the internal transactions that occur within the associated members of the group. 
It is precisely the ALP lack of connection with economic substance of intra-firm 
transactions, that constitutes the cornerstone of FA. 
 
The versatility of an allocation formula is also viewed as an advantage, since it “(…) 
could be applied toward specific sources of MNE income.”126 
 
The combination of different countries’ international tax rules often leads MNEs to 
devote their time and resources to explore legal tax loopholes, in a pursuit of tax 
incentives that may affect their economic decisions. Thus, design an adequate and 
acceptable apportionment mechanism presents substantial political and co-operation 
problems. Considered the question of the factors used in the formula and the impact that 
they would have on countries’ fiscal revenues under a FA system, it is possible to foresee 
the challenge to reach a consensus about the economic factors that should be included 
and their respective weight in the formula. 
 
 
3.3.1.    Why a destination sales-based formulary apportionment? 
 
As we can see by examine the U.S. system, formulary apportionment traditionally uses 
three factors to allocate the corporate income: labour, assets and sales127. 
Considering this, the individual factors included in the formula will ascertain where the 
profits will be taxed, therefore creating “(…) an implicit tax on the factors (…)”128. 
 
                                                          
123 WITTENDORFF (2011), p.248. 
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also proposed by the European Commission, in European Commission (2011), p.14. 




Naturally, it should be noted that introducing factors such as labour or assets would have 
the effect of discourage the in-state location of property and employment. Based on this 
major concern that reaches an economic and social level, preference should be given to 
the sales factor to quantify the economic activity. 
 
Moving away from an unsuitable arm’s length standard, a destination sales-based formula 
would implement a far simpler regime that would only be focused on the demand side. 
Furthermore, sales are a realistic element, meaning that corporations would have less 
room “(…) to undertake tax avoidance strategies (…) since [they] have no control over 
where customers are located.”129 
 
Multinational corporations are created in order to achieve highly profitable results, thus, 
even in high-tax jurisdictions, companies will have a strong motivation to sell. 
 
Finally, from a political angle, countries may consider the adoption of a destination sales-
-based formula with the purpose of preserve the elements of labour and assets that 




3.4.    Formulary Apportionment in the EU: Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base  
 
Since the Ruding Report, in 1992, the European Commission has been “searching for a 
more effective basis for corporate taxation” within the European arena131.  
 
The idea of a new strategy for EU company tax policy started to become more than just 
a whisper in 2001, with a proposal presented by the European Commission.  
It is stated by the Commission that a “comprehensive approach” based on a consolidated 
corporate tax base for European activities, would be more appropriate to deal with a 
majority of tax obstacles to Single Market than a “piecemeal approach”132. 
 
It is important to mention that the initial proposal of the Commission has identified four 
“technical possibilities” for a consolidation taxation: home state taxation; common 
consolidated corporate base taxation; EU corporate income tax; and a compulsory 
harmonized tax base133. 
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The merits of such proposal soon started to be pointed: arm’s length transfer pricing was 
no longer needed for tax purposes; tax-based distinctions between members would 
disappear; cross-border mergers would not incur adverse tax consequences; and cross-
border loss offset would automatically occur134. There was a general and strong 
conviction that this was the way to achieve a “greater efficiency, effectiveness, simplicity 
and transparency (…) [and thereby] to reap the full benefits of the Internal Market”135. 
 
Detailed work started to be formally developed in 2004 through a working group until 
2008136. In 2011, and as response to the Euro crisis, the Commission published a Proposal 
for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)137, 
which is highlighted as “an important initiative on the path towards removing obstacles 
to the completion of the Single Market”138. 
 
Under the proposal of CCCTB a set of common rules would be defined for all 
participating members for determination of the corporate tax base, on a consolidated basis 
for all the members of the corporate group (a common European tax base). The Member 
State where the corporation was headquartered would be responsible for the 
administration of the (common) tax base. Profits would then be apportioned amongst the 
participating states according to a pre-established sharing mechanism based on a formula, 
and would be taxed according to their national tax rates139. The general apportionment 
formula would comprise three equally weighted factors (labour, assets and sales). 
 
While the consistency of the national tax regimes is guaranteed by the common approach, 
tax rates would not be harmonized, expressing the Commission awareness towards the 
importance of states’ sovereignty on fiscal matters. Hence, Member States will continue 
to preserve the power to define their own tax rates, in line with the assumed objective of 
a “fair tax competition (…) [that considers] their market competitiveness and budgetary 
needs” 140. 
 
With respect to transfer pricing the Commission makes a statement that is, in our opinion, 
applaudable, by recognizing the use of arm’s length approach as “[a] key obstacle [for] 
the single market”. The Commission continues, stating that “(…) the way that closely-
integrated groups tend to organize themselves strongly indicates that transaction-by-
transaction pricing based on the 'arm's length' principle may no longer be the most 
appropriate method for profit allocation”141, and therefore, internal transactions are to be 
disregarded. 
 
                                                          
134 WEINER (2002), p.520. 
135 European Commission (2001), p.16. 
136 PICCIOTTO (2012), p.15. 
137 The Commission assumes the goal of “tackle some major fiscal impediments to growth in the Single 
Market (…) [namely] over-taxation and double taxation, (…) administrative burdens and high tax 
compliance costs.”, in European Commission (2011), p.4. 
138 European Commission (2011), p.4. 
139 WEINER (2002), p.521 and European Commission (2011), p.8. 
140 European Commission (2011), p.4. 




The CCCTB assumes the goal of “tackle some major fiscal impediments to growth in the 
Single Market (…) [namely] over-taxation and double taxation, (…) administrative 
burdens and high tax compliance costs”142. The allowance for a single compliance of a 
single set of rules in a single State, creates the tax environment of a “one-stop-shop”. 
 
 
3.4.1.    The viability of the Proposal 
 
The word “consolidated”, present in the acronym CCCTB, is a living proof of the EC 
ambition to take a major step towards fundamental tax reform in Europe. In accordance 
with art.115º TFEU and the principles of subsidiary and proportionality, the Proposal falls 
within the EU competence to stipulate legal measures of approximation that can affect 
the completion of the Internal Market143. 
 
As already mentioned, several advantages can be related to this proposal that appears to 
be a “dream come true” for MNEs and for the achievement of a full-fledged Single 
Market. 
However, it is crucial to have a complete overview of the effects and implications that a 
change to formulary apportionment in the EU could promote. 
 
At the heart of CCCTB lays the mechanism of sharing the consolidated tax base between 
Member States. Such approach is an absolute contrast from a profit determination based 
on an arm’s length standard, and as concluded by the EC, the results are of difficult 
assessment144. 
 
The fact that the Proposal is only applied to purely internal situations, namely, to the 
members of the corporation that are resident in Member States, is frequently pointed as a 
major limitation145. Consequently, the relations with non-EU entities will continue to 
employ an arm’s length approach. 
As PICCIOTTO notes, the main advantage of a unitary approach is therefore affected (at 
least, partially), once “(…) it allows TNCs to exclude intermediary entities which they 
use for tax avoidance, including those located in [tax] havens.”146 In our opinion, and in 
line with RIEDEL & RUNKEL147, the concern for a potential increase of profit shifting to 
tax havens that have their location outside the EU is justified, as a harmful effect derived 
by CCCTB. 
In this regard, PICCIOTTO suggests that a better approach “would be to require submission 
of a worldwide combined report.”148 Although we admit that this would be an ideal 
solution for most of the current tax problems, we have serious doubts regarding the 
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feasibility of this suggestion that would likely prove to be unrealistic from a political 
perspective. 
 
The EC mentions that the Proposal “(…) as an optional system, represents the most 
proportionate answer to the identified problems.”149 One must consider that a stipulation 
of optional nature will always create the need for “(…) two parallel systems running at 
the same time (…)”150 – the proposed new system (based on unitary taxation) and the 
existing national rules (based on separate entity taxation). Naturally, “tax administrations 
will have to manage two distinct tax schemes”, a fact that EC perceives that is 
“compensated” by other advantages151. The question that should be done is whether the 
compliance and costs created by the coexistence of two different systems outweighs the 
current cost element.  
However, the 2016 Proposal has already (partially) mitigated this problem, stating that 
CCCTB “would be mandatory for groups of companies beyond a certain size, namely 
those with a consolidated turnover exceeding €750 million”152; remaining optional for the 
rest of companies. 
 
In today’s economy intangible assets play a significant role, thereby ignore this major 
profit driver is likely to cause arbitrary and unreliable results. However, this was not the 
Commission’s understanding, since it considered that “[i]ntangibles should be excluded 
from the formula due to their mobile nature and the risks of circumventing the system.”153 
According to RÖDER, the arguments presented by the EC, that “intangibles are indirectly 
included in the apportionment formula via researchers’ salaries and research assets” are 
not meaningful, and present no correlation with the real “value of intangible assets 
actually generated”154. 
The possibility to include acquired intangible assets with reference to the historical cost, 
is not compatible with self-generated intangibles, that would require an annual evaluation 
with reference to a fair market value – it is likely that a feasible evaluation would not be 
obtained at an acceptable cost155. In addition, a solution that only excludes self-generated 
intangibles would be considered as clearly arbitrary. 
We agree with RÖDER when he claims that the exclusion of intangibles from the formula 
is “problematic”. While the risks of tax planning opportunities and tax compliance can be 
held as a valid justification, we are not so sure about the mobility argument presented by 
the Commission. 
 
Furthermore, we are far from being convinced about the Commission’s explanation that 
CCCTB would decrease the distorting effects of an unfair tax competition within the 
Internal Market. 
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If on one hand a consolidated and uniform tax base creates transparency, on the other an 
intensification of tax rate competition appears as a realistic scenario156 - raising the 
concern for a tax “race to the bottom”. A survey made by KPMG is able to demonstrate 
the disparity between effective corporate tax rates amongst the EU Member States157. It 
should be paid attention to examples such as France and Ireland158 as opposite tax realities 
within the same economic zone. 
 
Finally, once the apportionment of the consolidated tax base is determined by the CCCTB 
formula, the included factors (equally weighted in the formula) will naturally be 
considered for tax planning opportunities159. 
The allocation factors will exercise a direct influence on the company’s profit, as well as 
on the payable tax in each Member-State. Therefore, strategic decisions related to the 
factors (specially labour and assets) will be dependent on the formula used, which leads 
to distortions since the apportionment will not be made in an accurate way. For example, 
“there would be an incentive to outsource activities in high tax countries [so] associated 
assets and workforce would be eliminated from the asset and labour factor.”160 
 
 
3.5.    A clash between two realities: Formulary Apportionment vs. 
Arm’s Length Principle 
 
Initially, the creation of ALP was based on the necessity to encounter international profit 
distortions and to avoid double taxation. Albeit, the world on which it was implemented 
has been changing in a continuous process, giving rise to an utmost concern expressed by 
several tax experts and “economists [that] arm’s length principle is contrary to economic 
reality.” In fact, this is acknowledged as a structural problem of the method since it 
assumes “(…) that every subsidiary and permanent establishments within a group is a 
separate entity which conducts trade under free-market conditions with entities in the 
group.”161 
 
Integrated organizations and global trade are reflective of the multinationals’ pursuit for 
a profit maximization – that may include deceptive tax planning schemes to shift profits 
towards more attractive jurisdictions. 
The fact is that ALP is frequently pointed as a powerless method to capture the real 
purpose of economies of scale and scope perpetrated by large corporations. It is precisely 
this difficulty in applying the ALP to global financial trading that constitutes a major 
argument in benefit of a unitary approach. 
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Additionally, when compared to the current standard, a FA method would provide a 
decrease in administrative burden and compliance costs for both tax authorities and 
taxpayers, due to an apportionment based on internal available data. 
 
Despite the criticisms, the ALP is still regarded as a reliable solution for situations where 
independent market prices are easily observable162, or the degree of interconnection 
established between the members of a MNE is not considered a paramount element. 
However, arm’s length pricing depends on markets. Hence its vulnerability is exposed 
when “(…) no sufficiently-established market for unrelated-party transactions exists 
(…)”163, or a significant number of intra-group relations makes it nearly impossible to 
administer. 
 
As a threat to the fiscal system sustainability, tax advantages of tax havens would 
probably be eliminated by a well-designed FA system “(…) without the need for complex, 
difficult-to-administer [rules]”164. Indeed, the ability to manipulate transfer prices with 
the purpose to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions would be prevented, once FA assumes 
a unitary entity determination that comprehends all the affiliates involved in a unitary 
business. This directly addresses the issue of inter-nation tax equity, by “(…) allowing 
weaker and smaller countries to obtain their fair share of tax revenue [as it decreases] the 
risks of harmful tax competition (…)”165. 
Another field where the arm’s length approach has been showing tremendous difficulties 
to cope with, and that can be clearly pointed as one of its “Achilles heel”, refers to 
transactions of intangible assets. 
Once again, is important to remember the fact that these types of operations are not 
frequently undertake by independent enterprises. Thus, the absence of clear market 
benchmarks in conjunction with highly integrated corporate structures, precludes the 
determination of an arm’s length result. 
In the current economic reality MNEs “(…) exist because of their competitive advantages, 
foremost their [development and] control of unique technology [and intangible 
values]”166 167. 
 
Given the OECD inability to overhaul the current system, some Authors have mentioned 
the possibility of a (reasonable) middle ground solution that consists in a conjunction of 
the two methods168 - adoption of formulary apportionment in the context of arms’ length 
principle, instead of replacing the arm’s length principle with formulary apportionment. 
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Notwithstanding the advantages of profit-split method, which uses comparables to 
allocate the return on routine functions, it often leaves a residual. This may represent an 
opportunity to introduce, in the actual context, a formula that allocates the residual169; 
perhaps, this could be a solution for “hard-to-measure intangibles”170. 
At the eyes of several tax experts “the arm’s length principle and formulary 
apportionment should not be seen as polar extremes; rather, they should be 
[contemplated] as part of a continuum of methods ranging from CUP to predetermined 
formulas.”171 
 
Regardless of the scepticism around FA, mostly for political reasons, it is almost 
unanimously acknowledged that changing towards a unitary basis could guarantee a more 
intimate alignment between international tax system and economic reality, that way 
enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The fallacy that is possible to identify or quantify the income that could be earned by any 
of the component members, would give rise to the assumption that the income of a 
corporation is earned by that corporation as a whole. 
 
As AVI-YONAH and BENSHALOM describe, “[p]erfect solutions are hard to come by, 
[therefore] waiting for them [is just] an extremely unattractive policy trajectory.”172 It is 
certain that FA has its own struggles, although we tend to agree with PICCIOTTO when he 
refers that “these are minor compared to the problems it would eliminate.”173 
 
 
3.5.1.    The particular case of European Union 
 
The question of whether FA, as a method that seeks to determine where the real source 
of income is geographically located, should be introduced in the EU has been raised by 
several academics and policymakers. 
 
Notwithstanding the experience of nearly a century of combined reporting, we are far 
from convinced that the U.S. system would provide a considerable base of support for a 
transition from ALP to unitary taxation within the EU. As stated by RÖDER, “[a]t the 
current state of integration, the EU is not comparable to a federal state as regards its 
financial constitution (…) [since] Member States [still] retain a much higher degree of 
fiscal sovereignty (…)”174. 
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Indeed, we believe that this is a deeper and more fundamental question. When compared 
to the U.S., the EU does not share the same homogeneity amongst its Member States, and 
this goes even beyond the economic factor, as the cultural and social contrast reveals a 
lack of uniformity175. 
 
Considering the diversity and the disparity of economic interests, is possible to anticipate 
the difficulty to reach a consensus about the factors that should be included in the 
apportionment formula, and their respective weight. 
 
Although, as the European economy becomes more integrated, cooperation increases 
between Member States and companies gradually operate on a EU basis, “[t]he CCCTB 
would probably suit a region such as the EU [better] than an arm’s length framework.”176 
 
We truly believe that if modified and properly established, the CCCTB is most likely to 
undertake a role of major importance “(…) in the fight against both major types of 
international tax avoidance, the use of tax havens and transfer pricing”177, whilst increases 
a fair and efficient corporate taxation. 
 
Moreover, in a reality where multinational corporations do not quite belong to any 
jurisdiction, the implementation of the CCCTB in Europe would grant, in the words of 
AVI-YONAH, “(…) a good working example in the context of high tax jurisdictions”178, 
and could, therefore, contribute to “clear the path” for a transition from the ALP system 
to unitary taxation within the OECD members. 
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Transfer pricing is not an exact science and the context where these operations occur can 
be unique in their form and nature. 
 
Not only advances in information and communications technology has forever changed 
the traditional business processes, as it also contributed to a remarkable innovation across 
all sectors of economy, allowing for “(…) centralized management of geographical 
dispersed groups (…)”179 to be an actual reality. 
 
Internationally integrated operations are placed in the center of a new business economic 
stage, where comparables between independent enterprises (that frequently do not even 
exist) are uncapable of provide a reliable benchmark for the evaluation of complex intra-
firm transactions. 
The vulnerability of the actual transfer pricing regime is even more exposed if one 
considers the challenges that intangibles and tax havens represent to the separate 
accounting system, creating an enormous range of opportunities for tax avoidance. 
 
Following the line of RECTENWALD, “[i]t is clear that transfer pricing using ALS as a 
mechanism for allocating the income of MNEs is broken and unsustainable in its 
administration and for the purposes of revenue collection.”180 
Considered the reality of an increasingly global world, the weaknesses and conceptual 
flaws of the current system becomes undeniable. Therefore, we are led to disagree from 
SCHOUERI’s opinion that it would be reckless to “(…) [give]-away a half-century 
experience on the application [of arm’s length principle]”181. 
 
As the bulk and sophistication of associated transactions raises, the persistence for a 
separate approach becomes unacceptable. Perhaps it is time to face that the ALP has failed 
to keep pace with the changes in global economy. 
 
Against this background, the need to address tax planning strategies that allow large 
corporations to shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions where economic activity and real 
value creation occurs to low or no-tax jurisdictions, still remains. 
 
An alternative to the arm’s length standard, which is strongly suggested by academics, is 
formulary apportionment as a method based on true and readily determinable economic 
factors. Such system, if well-designed, would be able to eliminate several problems that 
currently “haunt” the arm’s length principle, as it would assure an inter-nation equity 
(desirable for developing countries and emerging economies). 
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The scenario of a unitary taxation is heavily present on the EU agenda, as a system that 
would make a sizeable contribution to full accomplish the ideal of an Internal Market and 
a complete economic integration amongst the Member States – this possibility is even 
more seriously considered if the argument of Euro crisis is summoned for the discussion. 
 
However, political challenges such as the sovereignty issue may present a problem to 
reach an agreement. If it is actually decided for the adoption of a consolidated base 
taxation with formula apportionment, further discussions will have to take place between 
countries in order to agree on two points: the definition of the formula; and the definition 
of the factors included in the formula and their respective weight on the allocation of 
profits between the Member States. 
 
Either way, the fact that the European Commission has decided to walk a different path 
from the one recommended and accepted by the OECD is already remarkable. 
 
Recalling the initially referred research question, “Is the Arm’s Length Principle the most 
efficient method to determine transfer prices and to solve the problems related to the 
allocation of profits amongst different tax jurisdictions? What are the alternatives, and 
will they perform better than the current method?”, and considered the state of art, we 
conclude that both tax approaches exhibit several strengths and drawbacks. Therefore, 
even though there is no unanimously accepted alternative that would be capable of rectify 
all the current tax problems related to transfer pricing, it is important to recognize the 
existent growing consensus about the necessity for further harmonization in the field of 
corporate income taxation and for the achievement of a more appropriate solution. 
 
Finally, the international community appears to regard with expectation what will be the 
EU’s next step on this matter and what will be the impact of such decision, before they 
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